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Nikolay P. MEDVEDEV,

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Professor of Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Peoples' Friendship
University of Russia (RUDN University) (Russia, Moscow)

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Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of Faculty of Humanities
and Social Sciences, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia
(RUDN University) (Russia, Moscow)

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www.souzpolitolog.ru
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souzpolitolog@yandex.ru

Executive Secretary
Shkurina S.S.

Computer-aided makeup by
Antsiferova A.S.

Translated by
Chernyshova E.V.

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N.P. MEDVEDEV

*Doctor of Sciences (political sciences),
Professor of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia,
Moscow, Russia*

D.E. SLIZOVSKIY

*Doctor of sciences (history), Professor,
Peoples' Friendship University of Russia,
Moscow, Russia*

V.A. GLEBOV

*Ph.D. in Legal Sciences, Associate Professor,
Department of Political Analysis and Management,
Deputy Head of the Department, Peoples' Friendship University
of Russia (RUDN University), Moscow, Russia*

GORBACHEV – YELTSIN – PUTIN: DISCUSSION AROUND MODELS OF POLITICAL REGIME. WHAT'S NEXT?

The present and future of political development in Russia is not in last place on the agenda of a wide variety of ideological and political forces and the wide-branched structure of the media at home and abroad. Objectively, the way the present and future of the Russian Federation and its political regime are seen and thought of, on the one hand, inflames passions, and on the other hand, obscures the essence of the ideological and political discussion and disputes on the issue. There is a need to better understand the issue, because neither the expert community nor the political scientists have a dominant and reasonable understanding of either the relations of the Russian socio-political movement, or political parties to a worthy ideology, to the preferred technologies of socio-political development in Russia, or political tasks for the state, political parties, leaders and Russian civil society. The most characteristic indicator of the unfavorable situation in the understanding of the future is the reaction to the demands of the society, political rivals or opposition forces to power, or the ruling elite, heterogeneous in its interests. The article does not present reflections of skeptics or optimists, but an attempt, based on the analysis of expert assessments of the current political discourse and the dynamics of the three models of political development of the country under Mikhail Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, to show the chronic inevitability that the future political system and political regime will repeat past historical events, episodes and actions. Let no one be surprised or impressed by the importance of the experience of radical political and historical

changes that have been and are experienced by Russia and their dependence on our actions and beliefs.

Key words: *political development, political regime, Mikhail Gorbachev's political regime, Yeltsin's political regime, Vladimir Putin's political regime, Russia's future.*

Introduction. Surveying the current socio-economic and political situation in the Russian Federation it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that the civil society and the state are in a state of tension. In the structure of politics, political development and political regime there are big and small issues and contradictions, but there is one fundamental problem. The problem is so important that if it is not resolved correctly or even if its resolution is protracted, all and everything will go wrong. For Russia and its people it's the problem of changing political leadership and seriously changing political regime. What's the intrigue?

The ruling class, state and society are not yet divided to such an extent as to immerse themselves in an atmosphere of chaos [13]. But such an atmosphere is not uncommon in our thousand-year long history. This is not yet a split in the society, followed by, as the history confirms, a turmoil from which, as once observed by the sharp-sighted V.O. Klyuchevsky, at the turn of the XVI – XVII centuries “...the people came out much more impressionable and irritated than before, lost their political endurance, which surprised its foreign observers of the XVI century, and was no longer the same meek and obedient instrument in the hands of the government. This change was expressed in a phenomenon that we did not notice before in the life of the Moscow state: the XVII century was in our history a time of popular revolts. This phenomenon is all the more surprising that it took place at the time of the kings, who by their personal qualities and manner of action, apparently, did not justify it “[15]. One should not give in to conceptual historicism, and stubbornly believe that all people and their actions are the product of only the historical process and the influence of history. But no one and nothing is immune from the fact that everything can happen again: changes, the height of impressions and irritability, loss of political endurance, unexpected popular riots, unjustified and unprovoked by the personal qualities and the way of action of the supreme rulers. The classic is right and accurate in many ways and can be applied for the verification of our time and circumstances of the development of social and political life. But it is permissible to make a point in his address without making a reproach. Maybe personal qualities and actions of the kings (presidents) serve if not as an excuse but as a trigger of unexpected changes and people's rebellions? Why not!

In our arguments, we adhere to the idea that currently there is no split in the Russian society. But there is a serious division between the left and the right, “patriots and idiots”, pochvenniki and Euro-atlantists, the rich, the very rich and

the poor. The separation between those who want to be themselves and those who want to live according to the pattern and example of others is also an obvious fact. Division affects all essential elements of the state and society, it traumatizes the psyche and consciousness of each individual taken separately. Many divisions generate different views, judgments and actions. The only question is whether it is a consequence of reality or of the picture of socio-political life we draw. However, it is more meaningful to assume that in both cases different views and assessments of the ruling political group or their opponents are primarily due to historical and political experience. For some expert group it is significant that such experience and its lessons suggest that “the decisive factor in history can be a series of minor events unfolding against the background of great ideas [6].” One of the creative political scientists and thinkers in Europe, Bulgarian Ivan Krastev is inclined to think so. It is possible to be guided by this logic and ideas, but it is possible to continue the line of reasoning and add from oneself: on the other, the opposite background, a lack of great ideas, even one (not a series!) of minor events (for example, a conflict within a narrow ruling group and the subsequent palace coup or unsuccessful re-election of the President, causal and causeless loss of trust in the President, impeachment) can provoke radical changes and cause radical actions and deeds. It will be appropriate to proceed from the fact that the intersection of political and historical experience and everyday realities is not a linear process not only in Russia and for Russia, but also in the entire world.

The peculiarity of the Russian political landscape, we assume, is that the subjects of reflections about the future of our country, external and internal actors, to whatever ideological and political class they belong, for the entire post-Soviet period, have not yet managed to take shape, first of all, in their ideological and political significance, either as a stable trend of ideological influence on the political development of the country with the account for the prescribed experience and traditions formed throughout its history, or as a political force of dominant influence. In the West, through the mouths of the analysts from *The Economist* this situation is described in a brazen form, calling Russia a “hollow power” [1]. German Gref speaking in his native country continues approximately in the same format of reasoning and in the alarmist continuum of reflection. He does not find another word to define the role of Russia except as a country-downshifter [3].

Besides, the Russian political elite will be alarmed and conditions for change in the attitudes of the Russian society and in the ranks of the political elite will be created by the event in Kazakhstan and the decision of the now ex-President of the country Nursultan Nazarbayev to retire early. Such actions may be inevitably reproduced in Russia under the pressure of different circumstances. In the meantime, the broadcast of such opinions becomes a specialty of a certain part of a certain social group in our country and abroad. It's a group that seeks to resolve its own socio-economic issues and improve its financial well-being with the greater impatience the more it views its role and mission in the present and, most importantly, in the future world.

We are far from opposing political abstractions and weighing them on the scales of pure reason. But what is the degree to which intelligence has become nonsense, if, for example, Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the 2019 Munich Security Conference, confidently said: “We are experiencing an epoch-making shift, as one era is coming to an end and so far only the rough outlines of a new geopolitical era are visible. While some countries are committed to maintaining a liberal international order, it is doubtful that they – often distracted by other domestic and foreign policy issues – are able to assume this role” [17]. And the US strategic documents identify Russia (along with China) as the main enemy because that these two countries want to form a world corresponding to their authoritarian model [8].

That is why it will be justified to believe that the forecast of the development of modern Russia is impossible without updating approaches to the analysis and understanding of the essence of the phenomenon and process. And since the problem of post-Putin development of the country is fragmentally present in the public space, it is another argument in favor of considering it from the standpoint of model reflection of at least three periods of post-Communist development, starting with M.S. Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, who laid the foundation for the future of the country, ways and means of its development.

Method. The content of the article is a reflection of the combined approach to the description of the evolution of political development of post-Soviet Russia through the prism of the analysis of political regimes of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin. Under the combined approach, we understand combination of the traditional method of the author's interpretation and reinterpretation of expert assessments, judgments on the subject of the study with the data of the memoir character of one of the authors, who was an active participant in the political events of the perestroika era in the USSR and the early stage of the formation of a new Russia. The results of the work are based on the analysis and synthesis of ideas and opinions of authors, different in their beliefs, in their life and professional experience, who have developed close views and assessments of the current and future political structure of Russia and its political regime.

Results. If we correctly interpret the situation within the unfolding discussion, the disputes and struggle over the future of Russia and its political development, it should be recognized that the aggravation of the struggle is caused by the depth of ideological differences within the ruling political elites and their opponents. It is impossible to exclude also transitions from one group to another of supporters and adherents of different worldviews, belief, interests. We cannot also exclude the fact that the public political space is filled, consciously and/or accidentally, with empty phrases and platitudes. We have not viewed so far reconciliation between opponents and hostile groups. Our thought in relation to the situation retouched by the expert community boils down to the fact that, first, everyone who is destined by fate and professional interests and who is charged

with the duty to think and decide is not yet conscious enough, groping, afraid to think; second, hence their indecision, shakiness, inconsistency. It is common for all subjects of public policy, without exception, to remain indecisive and be at the tail of nature's events. Therefore, the applied techniques and ways of explaining and fighting are viewed by the opponents in the political battles as hypocritical. The general public, addressed by political and propaganda gurus, experts and journalists, ceases to understand what is happening and what is the matter.

If you are willing to understand, what should be done and where to find a more or less solid basis for a way out of such a sad situation, we propose the following approach to expand the discussion in the form of author's statements, comments and interpretations of the facts and processes introduced in the text:

It is indisputable that without Gorbachev's reforms in politics, the analysis of subsequent reforms and transformations in all spheres of public life in Russia would be incomplete and distorted. At the same time, it is obvious that the subjective factor in the public policy of Russia in the early 90-ies did not play the primary role that it had played at the beginning of perestroika in the late 80-ies of the last century;

In the early 90-ies the demand for urgent reforms in Russian public life has become massively public. And, in this regard, political leadership, in our opinion, went to the background. Although the general public and democratically minded political elite was seeking for a leader, who would be ready to carry out radical reforms. And in this context the figure of B.N. Yeltsin, as an experienced fighter against the political regime, was clearly dominant and leading in those years;

As for Putin's coming to power in the early 2000s and his concept of "restoring order" through a system of centralization of public administration and maximum compression of the public political environment, these methods of political management correspond to the traditional Russian political culture and still enjoy broad popular support.

At the same time, researchers have the main and most important question for the future reforming Russia. President Putin is finalizing his last constitutional six-year term. And what will happen to the policy of Russia, what changes will accompany the existing V. Putin's political regime further, the question remains open. But we can surely say today that presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine and the voluntary resignation of N. Nazarbayev as President of Kazakhstan will add intrigue to the determining of future of Russia's political regime.

Discussion.

A) Conditions for the provision and execution of the study. A series of articles and materials on Putin's regime in the electronic periodicals and networks, print media, TV and radio, foreign registered and unregistered as media in opposition to the current government launched in 2019 a new discussion on the alternative ways of changing power in 2024. The previous discussion held in 2018 under the motto "What does Putin want?" on the assurance of its ideo-

logical and organizational inspirers “is still waiting to be completed”. But a new version of the discussion on the same topic has already been launched under the motto “The Problem of 2024”. Columnist Andrei Kolesnikov informed us about it in his article “Putin’s System: the Age of Survival” and the editorial board of *The New Times* confirmed it. The author of the column paints a gloomy picture of an endless impasse and missed opportunities to change the political development of the country in 2007 or at the peak of “post-Crimean idiotic euphoria”. And the editors of this publication are ready to provide their readers with publications that will answer the questions: “... in what country would you like to live, or, in case of a good outcome, would you agree to a slow vegetating”; and “how will the change of power take place in 2024, when the powers of the current President expire, and the Constitution – at least in the form in which it exists now – will not allow Putin to be re-elected for the next term” [5].

Reflections radically opposed to Putin’s political regime are heterogeneous in relation to the interpretation of the origins of the crisis or in relation to the content of the current stage of the political process in the country. Permanent author of *Republic* Oleg Kashin in December 2017 in an interview to that publication stated: “What is important to understand is that all references to a greater freedom than now is hypocrisy because it is logical that after the free year 1991 it is impossible to immediately establish a non-free year 2017, it is necessary to slip down, spending a noticeably long time on it. We’ve slipped down to our condition, it is normal” [10]. Journalist Kashin found, in his own words, the following “curse motto” as a short formula to describe Russia in 2017 and such motto is “indifference”. He proposes the following way for legalizing this state “to do with unnecessary hope”. “...Unnecessary hopes must give way to realism”, [10] this is what O. Kashin proclaims. What Kashin’s “friends” conceal, Kashin reveals. We believe that Kashin and his colleagues mean that there is no way out of the current situation in the country besides a fight against unnecessary hope. Therefore, if people like Kashin do not succeed in gaining the upper hand in the sacred struggle against unnecessary hope, the situation will become legally hopeless. But we cannot say that Kashin seriously opposes his own ideological partners. He and his associates hastily and persistently try to change the political system and strive to achieve in the future some other structure, “other than that set by the 1993 Constitution and the tsarist consciousness of the unconscious part of the society”.

The journalistic form of such materials (only *The New Times* and only in January 2019 presented to its readers four such texts [2]) and the most serious plans of exposures (political scientists and experts received an invitation to join the discussion) raise not without the bases the question of crisis of political development in the country and a threat to the lives of its citizens in case of its aggravation. Such reflections are supported or even initiated by certain groups of Russian citizens who have left the country and embarked on the path of exposing the au-

thoritarian Putin's regime. Foreign experts, journalists, mass media, governments of a number of countries of the world are in solidarity with such assurances and actions and actively support them [16]. The governments of some states, members of the European Union and North American countries while planning their foreign policy attach the most serious importance to the factor of Russia's geopolitical influence. Is political power and political resource of such a systemic opposition to the official power of the country great? And isn't it a phantom of their great imagination? There is every reason to believe that the opposition and a part of the political establishment of the country remain adherents of the Western way of life and are held captive by strangers and foreign ideas, thus getting into a false position.

The number of those whom journalist A.V. Kolesnikov defines by the pronoun "we" and whom in the political dimension we consider a radical opposition to power is not growing but their influence on the minds and moods of the citizens is increasing because of the growing number of publications and their volume [14]. This is the peculiarity of this unhappy and sad but unavoidable streak in the modern history of the Russian opposition.

On the other ideological and political flank of the explanations and analysis of the current situation on this issue there is also a noticeable revival [11]. According to the views of the group of experts and specialists, it is believed that today and in the future the most interesting ideas will be those relating to the conceptualization of the institution of the presidency and the role of the president in it. In this regard, references to the historical analogues and models of the previous epochs of the country's development, especially the post-Soviet period, will be natural [7]. No matter how far political science has advanced in this direction, we note that in the Russian and foreign scientific community, among the various ideological and political groups and trends in Russia itself, there is no clear understanding of the sources and components of the content and nature of the new stage of political development of the Russian Federation. In domestic consumption for Russia there is also no understanding of the sources and components of the forecast and models of development of the country in the interests of the Russian society and the state.

That is why we believe that in the political process of modern Russia there are elements of historical choice and illusions of this very choice. And abandoning "this very illusion in favor of realism of predestination" [12]. All of it forms an atmosphere of drama and tragicomedy in the society. The tragicomedies of the Russian opposition and the powerful bureaucratic and pro-oligarchic forces are to some extent identical and even very similar. And it's a tragicomedy because the liberal and patriotic elites do not notice how their statements and their positions have become a mere rehash of ideas of their political supporters from the past epochs of Russian history, hungry for reforms and changes, that have eventually given rise to the revolution and chaos. Who will be able to stop this

tragicomedy, will it be the liberals from the opposition, liberals from the government or their political opponents – traditionalists and nationalists, pochvenniki or statist? Maybe this question and the answer to it have become phrases repeated out of habit? But it would be productive and useful to consciously and thoughtfully apply this variant of representations according to the changed situation at least in relation to the constitution, to the foreign and domestic economic policy, to the changes of trust in power and government institutions.

Another element is important, in our opinion, in the reality of the political development of the country. If there are no fundamental disputes regarding the future of the country as a multifactorial process, which of the factors play a dominant role, and which are secondary and subordinate, and what political and social forces are behind this or that factor, this is still a hidden mystery of knowledge and understanding of the process; and the structure of power and government, the structure of political forces. What should be considered a factor, what combination of factors and political forces should be considered a stable tradition for the future of Russia, which is an exception? What was and will be a special case, a feature of a political regime of the country, and what is the common heritage of the history of the Russian nation and statehood? We learn from various actors of the political system about the advent of authoritarianism that undermines democracy and the future of the country, and about the readiness to strengthen the sovereignty of the country by all means. And if we admit that the disputes about the future are endless and will be long and a solution will not be found, then it's the fault of not only the disputants, but, apparently, in the subject of the dispute. With this approach, the shortcomings of the academic and political vision of the future of the country could be explained by differences in ideological, political and party-political positions, diverse in composition and structure, influential or only claiming to be influential and capable of winning the minds of social and political forces, but not capable of consolidating around domestic and foreign policy and vision of the future strategy. But, apparently, both factors, the lack of understanding that different historical periods put forward different factors, different sides of the dominant ideology only simplify the political process itself and the character of the country political development and its understanding. The problem remains the same for all political and ideological forces. And this problem is not who is right and why there are no conditions for solidarity in the search for answers to the challenges of the present and future of the country. And what we tend to in our research is an establishment of trust of the authorities to the citizens, of the citizens to the government; of the government and opposition to each other for the sake of the future, enlightened and ensured by the quality of the living conditions and should not be a ghost.

The question about the status of political development of the Russian Federation, and in this regard, of the future of the country, its role and place in the geopolitical balance of power is put to the fore in the Russian and foreign polit-

ical science environment and the press, causing distortions, bewilderment and fluctuations in the moods and minds of especially the Russian expert community and in the minds of ordinary citizens. We can accept the opinion that the problem of political development of the Russian Federation today is not very important for the ordinary citizens. But it is a very interesting issue for specialists and political scientists both in Russia and abroad. And the interest will only increase as we get closer to the deadline of the presidential elections. What do we see in this regard? Unfortunately, for supporters of reducing the degree of tension in the country, the explanation and clarification of the essence and meaning of the growing interest is conducted through deepening the crack, and not through the possibility of its erasure between ideological and political theorizing and ideological and political realism; between the opposition to power and power to the opposition; between the leadership of Putin and bureaucracy and the autocracy of Putin himself and his entourage.

The search for ways to further political development has determined the logic of our further research and allows us to turn to the signs and grounds, strong and weak elements of the model of political development of the three Russian leaders of the last thirty years. Let's start with M.S. Gorbachev.

B) Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost: the strength and weakness of the political model of development. Gorbachev's model of the development of society and the state, associated with the two concepts of perestroika and glasnost, so stirred up the interests of all social strata of the society that it seemed that those socio-political mechanisms would allow Russian (Soviet) citizens to quickly turn from passive contemplators into active participants in all social and political processes. But that was not the case. That model of public life for politicians and leaders of all stripes did not exist long. The first, the most significant results of perestroika and glasnost Kremlin received in the form of opposition represented by independent people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR in 1989-1990. During the entire Soviet period of the country that was the first true public clash of interests between the government and the people, which eventually grew into a serious political conflict. Clumsy administrative decisions and even power methods (GKCHP) did not help the nomenklatura to stay in the Kremlin using the Soviet-Communist model of governance. The decision to establish the State Emergency Committee was the last belated and erroneous decision of the perestroika Kremlin-party administration.

The events of August 1991 (GKCHP) became the starting point for the development of a new post-Gorbachev model of the country political development. But the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after these political upheavals broke up and the new Russia became a somewhat different state, a state with other economic, socio-political problems and potential opportunities, as well as with another matured electorate and several updated political institutions.

The most valuable element of Gorbachev's model of political development, of course, is publicity, because it ensured the effectiveness of public policy at

that time and became a symbol of further strengthening of all democratic institutions of the new Russia. In this regard, it should be emphasized that it was a positive trait almost completely discarded by President Vladimir Putin by 2018, since “Putin’s model” suggests communication between the government and society without a feedback, one of the main reasons for the social passivity and the growth of corruption at all levels of power.

Naturally, Putin’s model simplifies the management system, makes it more mobile and reduces risks and pro-Kremlin experts consider it a positive achievement. Such point of view is permissible given the complex Russian history. But we should not forget that without public participation and transparency the effectiveness of public administration sharply reduces in all spheres of public life. Serious sources of latent political conflict are emerging. Due to the closed nature of the government in recent years, the state and municipal service has been particularly clogged by untrained officials, who often use state resources for personal enrichment. For the same reason, the continuity of power is largely broken.

C) Yeltsin’s democracy and radical reforms. Yeltsin’s model of social development is a controversial and complex subject for political analysis. But the main task that faced post-Communist Russia and the political elite of that time – decentralization of power and the economy was mainly fulfilled thanks to the mechanisms of Yeltsin’s decisive actions. Despite the huge losses, privatization has been carried out. Power began to be exercised on the basis of its division into legislative, executive and judicial. Constitutional reform has been carried out.

In political terms, the most significant loss of the Yeltsin reform period was the actions of the authorities to discredit and then almost completely eliminate political opposition as an autonomous institution. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the competitive environment for public policy began to disappear in Russia. These circumstances were the main reason for the formation of the new opposition structures around regional leaders, which further had a negative impact on the segmentation of the political and legal space in Russia and led to a weakening of political and party influence on the process of government decision-making. It should be borne in mind that the democratic model of Yeltsin reforms and competitive political development operated only until 1996. From 1996 to 1999, the processes of power decentralization took an ugly character. In this regard, the first steps by President Vladimir Putin aimed at the centralization of power in Russia to restore a single constitutional and legal space were quite predictable and very popular in Russian society.

D) Putin’s authoritarianism and centralization. If at the beginning, the Putin’s moves in the socio-political sphere can be considered positive and necessary for the restoration of constitutional order and political stability, the further centralization and full bureaucratization of the political decision-making process had a negative impact on the entire course of the political process in Russia. The necessity to use military force to resolve the Chechen conflict was accompa-

nied by an increase in the use of command methods, often unjustified, throughout the Russian Federation and in all spheres of civil life. In order to approve such a management model, it was necessary to maximize compression of all segments of the public policy competitive environment.

And of course, the most serious consequences for the democratic system of the new Russia were associated with the elimination of the independent media that provided feedback to the authorities from the society and helped the Kremlin administration in the most difficult 90-ies of the last century to respond adequately to the demands of the public. And the allegedly new multi-party system proposed to resolve that problem closed all valves for direct communications between people and authorities. The current model of formation of power on the basis of a proportional electoral system (according to party lists) finally led to the fact that all feedback lines between people and power were broken and the ruling elite finally distanced itself from the society. The process of bureaucratization of all channels of Russian public policy was largely completed by the beginning of 2008. Here, apparently, worked the traditional militant Russian principle “it is necessary to destroy everything to the end”. But the trouble is that it is impossible to come up with anything new in terms of the development of a competitive political environment. As they say there is a great and successful experience of many countries. And all the nonsense associated with the Russian model of “sovereign democracy” did not become a serious basis and, moreover, a justification for such authoritarian actions, which were like an antipode to Gorbachev’s glasnost and Yeltsin’s decentralization and were aimed at maximal strengthening of political uncontested leadership. The final Kremlin action to finalize the political model of authoritarianism was the program of “national leadership” represented by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

What are the consequences of the nineteen-year influence of this model of public administration on the Russian political system?

The most damaging for modern Russian politics is the return to the process of ensuring political stability not through political institutions, but through political authorities and “national leadership”. It’s well known, scientists and experts involved in political conflictology have long proved that such actions of the Kremlin will inevitably lead to a latent and then open political conflict and instability. As world experience shows, national leaders in the conditions of democracy are not able to provide a legitimate procedure for the continuity of political power. Therefore, President Putin will have to choose in the near future: either to restore the difficult for the current Kremlin model of consensus political governance, or to continue strengthening the established model of authoritarianism and centralization. The results of 2018 demonstrate that basically no one wants to change anything. Of course, there are serious reasons for this related to the high rating of the President of Russia. But how long will this socio-political balance last? After all, the system of bureaucratic leadership that has developed in recent years is not

capable of developing in the crisis conditions. And as evidenced by the political history of modern Russia crises and conflicts arise in the period of change of the ruling elites. At the same time, we should not discount the so called hostile foreign political environment.

A complete reliance on the official structures of power for the resolution of internal and external state problems does not fully meet the requirements of the time and current Russian structure of the society and economy. At the same time, we should not forget that bureaucracy in the conditions of authoritarianism primarily due to the low level of professionalism and education is an average, passive and incapable of creativity bureaucratic environment. And this is the origin of no alternative way in politics, which has been practically continuing for 19 years. Such a political model is effective only in the conditions of social and economic stability. And in such socio-political environment, bureaucratic structures are active, to a greater extent, only if the system is cleaned from foreign germs and opposition.

Making a preliminary conclusion, it should be noted that Putin's model of political management has successfully coped with the post-Yeltsin socio-political problems, but has not coped with many problems of the strategic plan, primarily with the foreign policy plan. As for internal policy issues, the current centralized model of public administration has not fully managed to implement the strategy of maximum alignment and compliance of the tasks of establishing proper state order with the problems of parallel development of all Russian socio-political institutions.

Conclusion. Trust on the basis of recognition and explanation of the connection between the national liberal-democratic movement and, first, the general philistine mood of “indifference” and the image of “unnecessary hope”; and second, the state power, cursed and rejected by those forces, in whatever hands it is at the post-Soviet stage of the country development, should be a reality and not a ghost. The peculiarity of the modern Russian political agenda is that the radical opposition to the state power under the banner of liberalism and democracy rejects it because of authoritarianism and ruined democratic institutions. But at the same time, radical authoritarianism and Russian modern bureaucracy, complete in its essence, are flirting with liberalism and its supporters.

It is also necessary to take into account the obvious fact that the opposition, scolding and criticizing Putin's stage of government and presidency, do not clean it from immanent ulcers and do not form an enlightened image of the future ideology. Instead, they support and nurture liberal ideology and politics, systemically turning democracy into a servant of the oligarchy and financial bigwigs of the country and global structures.

Hence, forming a vision of the future of the country, so tenacious and stable, it is necessary to take into account the ordinary kind of national liberalism and its political substrate, the kind that is in opposition to the state and government

forces, the kind that is nothing more but the same state executive power in federal and regional institutions, in the centers of analysis and decision-making, among the political establishment, eager to live in the Western manner. These people are ready to accept the ideal of the future president in a man who can spend his unlimited power to dismantle the existing political system, dismantle the whole system, the most important, dominant part of which they themselves form. After finishing with the existing political regime, that political force may do away with the existing type of the state and with itself without noticing it. Who will then be destined to give the only true, from their point of view, answer to the most pressing issues of the modern socio-political movement in Russia? It's hard to say who and when exposes each other more in political beau-mond. But it is worth considering what will be the result of the battle of two political opponents for one common country. Will it bring any good?

The content, logic and dynamics of the three models of the country political development under Mikhail Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin demonstrate, among other things, the futility, fallacy and falsity of the narrow understanding of the socio-political movement to an enlightened, democratic and prosperous national future, proclaimed by both: opposition to power and pro-government forces, each considering itself right. If the political elite of the country had less skilled, dexterous and agile politicians and more politicians with the faith in themselves and their people, they would be able to come to an agreement and prove their case.

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