GOPTAREVA I.B. Post-Democratic Changes in Party Design

I.B. GOPTAREVA Doctor of political sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Chair of General legal disciplines and political science, Orenburg State University, Orenburg, Russia

POST-DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN PARTY DESIGN

The article deals with the transformation of political parties with permanent membership (PCH) into "new party models," which takes place in the countries of Western democracy and is caused by the growth of socio-political organizations, the decrease in the participation of party supporters in elections, the weakening of the unifying force and the political attractiveness of parties. The above reasons formed the grounds for the change of party structure in the direction of "parties without party members". In the context of these changes, the most interesting issues are the correction of intra-party relations, organizational structure, inter-party competition and policy objectives which determine changes permitting the conclusion about new party models with limited social and expanded mediation and management functions.

The use of a descriptive and comparative approach to describe and order party realities through classification features, as well as an explicative method as the most relevant to explain the cause-and-effect relations of party transformation led to the conclusion: mass parties in the twentieth century have now completed a three-stage transformation (mass-ideological (MIP), universal(UP), cartel parties (CP)), which resulted in a significant reduction in the institution of membership; the rigidity of the internal structure of the parties indicates one of the main reasons for its reduction; the cartelization of parties indicates the transition of the PCH to the final stage, after which it is possible to speak about the metamodels of the PCH, since the institution of membership, though greatly weakened, but not disappeared.

Key words: mass ideological parties, universal parties, cartel parties, party models, party competition, stratarchy.

Party restructuring, which began in the countries of Western democracy and later in other democracies, carries a lot of signs of changes in party models (and possibly party types) that have been occurring during the second half of the twentieth century and continue to date in the vast majority of countries in accordance with the same scheme: mass ideological parties – universal parties (or catch-all parties) – cartel parties. Of the thirteen comparative characteristics of these types of parties (excluding the elite or personnel type associated with the censorship of suffrage and therefore almost absent in the current party design), described by R. Katz and P. Mair , the most interesting for us are those that help to understand the "novelty" of party models of the last few decades:

– policy objectives: social transformation or resistance to such transformations (MIP), social improvement (UP), politics as a profession (CP);

– main source of party resources: membership fees and donations (MIP), using extensive donations and grants (UP), state subventions (CP);

– relationship between ordinary members and party elite: responsibility and accountability of the elite to the members of the party (MIP), priority of the elite welcomed by ordinary members (UP), stratarchy, mutual autonomy (CP);

– position of the party between the civil society and the state: parties as an important segment of the civil society (MIP), parties as competing brokers between the society and the state (UP), parties as part of the state (CP);

– representational style of the party: delegate (MIP), entrepreneur (UP), the agent of the state (CP) .

Dominance of mass ideological parties, referred by R. Katz and P. Mair to the period between 1920-1960-ies, was due to the change of personal influence of the elite by the power of the masses and the commercial press, diluted by party newspapers. The main change here was that the relations between the leaders and the "base" of the party (members and supporters) were built "from the bottom up", and not vice versa, as in the elite (personnel) parties. The MIP reached its peak between the two world wars, when they offered alternative and not necessarily democratic development concepts, for the implementation of which an extensive and hierarchical organizational structure was created, in which a party member had a colossal influence, which he never had either before or after . Membership for mass parties was the main source of funding, since they could not, except in isolated cases, receive such huge donations as were available to personnel (elite) parties usually from people with large fortunes. With the expansion of funding for mass parties (from private donations to state subsidies), the institute of membership began to blur, the "bottom – up" pyramid was gradually replaced by "top-down" and the institute of membership became less obligatory. Of course, the question was not only about sources of funding, the post-industrial era came, social conditions changed, the possibilities of modern mass communications grew – all this contributed to the emergence of new models of parties whose organizational structure no longer needed support from a certain segment of the population .

The dominant model after mass ideological parties became universal parties , the emergence of which can be seen as a reaction of the political elite to the success of the MIP. When O. Kirchheimer introduced in 1965 the term "catch –all party" to refer to the "ideal type" parties that emerged in Western democracies in that period of time when democratic parties experienced an increased interest from various segments of the population against the background of social and political unity, improving economic conditions and social homogenization, he considered that the time was ripe for a party of a different modification, differed from MIP. The main function of such party should be nomination of candidates to legitimize the public such as officials employed in the elected authorities. It was based on the assumption that the acute class contradictions of the early stages of MIP formation have over time been mitigated or replaced by a comprehensive consensus , therefore, the universal parties refrain from uniting their supporters on ideological or moral grounds, do not attach such importance to the institution of membership as the MIP, increasingly focus on working with the population as a potential electorate. In intra-party work, the first place goes to the development of programs and the definition of goals, expressing the interests of the majority.

O. Kirchheimer drew attention to the fact that the change of parties usually occurs in the direction from the class or religious communities to open electoral associations. He believed that the mass parties become similar, which ensures their universal character, expressed by signs, greatly distinguishing catch-all party from the MIP: elimination of the ideological component, strengthening the top of the party (the status of leader), depreciation of the role of a single party member, limitation of the role of the party organization to the drawing up of the list of candidates and expansion of the electoral base through various interest groups acting as brokers, ensuring the consent and integration of interests . In the search of supporters, these parties have learned to benefit from the weakening of grassroots solidarity, which usually occurs after large social conflicts (revolutions, wars, crises), as well as from the growth of social mobility, from the spread of the media, etc. In this case, the policy of convergence provided a chance to find supporters in different segments of society by revealing the unifying interests. Parties of this kind, having connections and contacts with authorities, prefer to carry out intermediary functions between the population and the state; widely use compromises, agreements, negotiations with various social groups and the organizations, they act so that no layer of the population is ignored by their attention, carry out the policy of alignment of cumulative demands and requirements. In addition, the main functions of the UPs include establishment of links between the broad sectors of voters and the political system, coordination of various areas within the political system to simplify the procedure of agreements between them, definition of goals and priorities for the development of the state, formation of the government and control of opposition parties .

The significant consequences that change the party landscape, as a result of the activities of universal parties, include, firstly, an increase in the number of voters who are not tied to any party and constantly change them, that results in the growth of electoral volatility, perceived in this case as an indicator of the overall change in parties and party systems against the background of social movements, acting as an alternative to political representation ; second, the change of party models changing in the direction from the ideological to the de-ideologized and democratic integration parties. The traditional binding of parties to the socio-moral support is reduced to zero, the importance of electoral subjects mediating large non-party organizations (trade unions, associations of voters, etc.) decreases, and the behavior of voters is increasingly determined by individual sympathy. Party competition weakens and is limited by discussion of candidates, questions of property and coalitions which makes parties similar to each other. At the same time, the center of gravity of the parties' change is gradually shifting from civil society to the state, meaning only one thing: parties are no longer able to fulfill their traditional duties, i.e. to ensure transparency and participation to the extent typical for the MIPs . The latter remark can also be attributed to the characteristics of cartel parties, which are a continuation of the model of universal, but with an increase of the signs that distance them from the civil society.

Similar to the economic sphere, where entrepreneurs seeking to limit market competition create cartels, in the political sphere, the political class (the non-ruling elite, economically influential groups of interests, the party elite) interested in the weakening of political competition began in the 1970s to form political cartels or cartel parties that R. Katz and P. Mair defined in the 1990s as one of the party's new conceptual models , the goal of which is to ensure parliamentary mandates to the leading politicians . It should be noted that the model of cartel parties is not a "successor" to the previous models and does not replace them, but coexists with them. It is quite difficult to define and distinguish the dynamic cartel model from the previous ones, but using the index of three dimensions of cartel parties, proposed by K. Detterbeck , it is possible to understand the basic features of this process:

– political role of the party: management as a "semi-state agency";

– party competition: cartelization and elimination (of unnecessary competitors);

– organizational structure: parliamentarization and stratarchy.

Political role of the parties is to determine the position they occupy between the society and the state. The concept of the cartel party model postulates the loss by the West European parties of the possibility and ability to perform representative functions (articulation and aggregation of interests, setting of goals, political mobilization) in favor of more active participation of "mandate holders" (i.e. the part of the party that falls into the elected authorities – party in public office) in the implementation of legislative and governmental functions. In this case, the party leadership is more interested in parliamentary "battles" than in the necessary internal party Affairs (for example, the interpretation of party statutes or policy discussion at party congresses), i.e. the object of its activities is not the society, but the state, which makes this part of the party relatively independent of its members, who continue working with the electorate and support their own (member) backbone (party on the ground) . This measurement leads to the conclusion that cartel parties are characterized, on the one hand, by the weak participation of party members and historically related interest groups in intra-party work, and, on the other, by focusing on governance, more precisely, on government functions and public resources.

Party competition in the context of changes in social conditions, the weakening of the class struggle, ideological and political pluralism, as well as a shared interest of the parliamentary parties in the guaranteed state subsidies have changed the attitude of the party's opponents to each other and resulted in the formation of a political class that laid the basis for collective action aimed, above all, at the increase of private income than at the control or government functions. The cartelization of parties was related to the need to reduce the consequences of electoral competition, mainly through bargaining or collusion: the granting of legally established state subsidies to the losers or the granting of opposition status. "Exclusion" (selection) is a kind of mechanism (for example, through the establishment of electoral thresholds, exclusion of "newcomers" from obtaining state subsidies, limiting their access to the media, etc.) protecting the rooted parties against newcomers in the competition for the role of the state agent in its deals with the society. However, even the cartel parties cannot develop without updating, so this model provides for the co-optation of new parties ready to play by the established rules. But weakening or eliminating competition ultimately widens the gap between the voters and the politicians, making it difficult to legitimize political decisions with all the consequences. That is why cartel parties are called the "Achilles' heel of democracy" .

The organizational dimension determines the balance of power within the party. The mechanism of intra-party decision-making is determined by the structural and material resources of various "persons" within the organization. The cartel party is a kind of "public administration party" as it is directly related to political decision-making in the parliament, in the government, access to the media, etc. The organizational structure of the cartel parties involves vertical autonomy of different levels of the party: national, regional, local. Party elite at the national level (parliamentarians) is trying to get rid of the requirements of party leaders at the regional level, the latter – from the leaders of the local level on significant issues of policy and strategy of the party, the lower levels have won the autonomy of decision-making in their sphere (for example, the choice of candidates, local politics, etc.), which contributed to the formation of a stratarchical model of relations within the party, being a polycentric, multi-layered structure of power . However, some elements of the hierarchy are more or less preserved here, the center, for example, has the right to punish the branches in case of their deviation from the established party rules. The party elite at the national level controls all resources of the party, since some of them it spends to support the lower party infrastructure. Therefore, the concept of party stratarchy means, first of all, the balance between control and autonomy .

The appearance of parties with "weakened" membership indicates the erosion of the social basis of the parties, while the party tops are almost unchanged. This process concerns, first of all, grass-roots party organizations and negatively affects the organizational strength and functional ability of the parties as central links and mediators between the state and society . Since the beginning of their development, the mass ideological parties have relied on grassroots structures, which in turn were formed from the active part of the population participating in various social organizations (from trade unions to choral societies), carrying a culture of solidarity, partnership and social communication and bringing unity norms and values in the political sphere. These parties formed long-term relationships between their subculture and institutions of democratic governance, marked by such signs as exclusivity, long-term stability and discipline. Using their organizational structures and extra-parliamentary organizations, they solved the problems of political education, socialization and mobilization. Thus, the parties themselves become resources . But the post-war political, socio-economic and other changes weakened social ties, sharply strengthened political content and the institution of mediation, competition was replaced by flexible adaptation of parties to changes in the electoral market. The replacement of one dominant party model (or type) by the other each time makes the relationship between party members and the party elite weaker, and the latter increasingly focuses on the electorate, which means a change in the meaning and logic of the institution of membership, which ultimately leads to the displacement of the PCH by the "party of the electorate" . In addition, party leaders have significantly expanded (and continue to do so) their media capabilities, making electoral struggle personal, allowing party leaders to evade responsibility to party members, and the latter are concerned about the growing "chiefdom" .

The change in PCH of varying intensity, which affected many European parties, influenced the party structure of post-modern parties: parties of professional politicians led to the emergence of a new political class representing a privileged "transfer" class, living at the expense of the state budget . Elements of the party cartelization highlighted the paradoxical role of party members: strengthening of the individual, the weakening of the collective; the interests of the professional politicians of the dominant parties are satisfied through participation in a political cartel, which includes the freedom of action for the party elite . Stratarchy: weakening of vertical integration of the party, strengthening the autonomy of regional party offices on the organization, strategy programs, coalitions; intra-party division of power through mutual autonomy: the party center determines the general line, local party formations take care of the presence and mobilization in the field.

The general problem of "new party models" continues to be the cumulative deficit caused by changes in the formation of public opinion (ousting the party press popular media-political talk shows, scandalous chronicle, etc.) and the loss of social and moral environment, which destroyed the party and public relations, which is the main reason for the weak integration of public interests parties.

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